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ABSTRACT
Scholarship on the impact of visits by the president of the United States on
midterm gubernatorial elections is limited. This paper will examine the effects of such
visits by the president of the United States on midterm gubernatorial elections. Cohen,
Kreassa, and Hamman (1991) analyzed the impact of presidential visits on senate races
and discovered these visits are strategic; also, when the president gets involved in an
election, the president has a positive impact. I also believe that when different visits are
split out different types of visits will have different effects. This is based on the time
commitment of the president as the more time spent on a visit the greater the impact the
visit should be. Using an original dataset, I evaluate how visits by the president effect
vote share; this is as I seek to adapt some of the findings of the strategic calculations of
the president to determine the impact of those visits by the president. My analysis shows
that presidential visits have a positive effect on the vote share of the midterm
gubernatorial candidates. In addition, I find that rally visits have the most consistent
positive impact on candidates over the other types of visits analyzed in this study. Finally,
when analyzing the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact of a visit has
variation dependent on the partisan composition of a state.
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INTRODUCTION
How does a president affect a candidate of their party in a midterm election? This
question is discussed with great frequency following every midterm election. Pundits
discuss the effect of whether a candidate embraced the president or if that same candidate
adopted the correct strategy in distancing their campaign from the president. This is
particularly true with candidates of the president’s party when deciding whether to
receive a visit from the president or whether to distance themselves from the president.
For example, following the 2014 elections, this question of whether a candidate
should have campaigned with the president was once again asked after a historic election
for the Republicans. This is particularly true with Governorships as Republicans were
able to pick up many states that President Obama won in the previous two general
elections. However, one notable exception in this Republican wave election was in
Pennsylvania where the incumbent Republican governor lost his seat to the Democratic
challenger Tom Wolf in that midterm gubernatorial election. This is even more notable as
it was the first time an incumbent governor running for re-election had been defeated in
Pennsylvania. Another reason that Wolf is a notable exception is because Democrats such
as Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu, Mark Udall, Kay Hagan, and Mary Burke went out of
their way to distance themselves and even avoid visits from President Obama. Tom Wolf
did not adopt this approach. Rather Wolf’s campaign embraced the president and actively
campaigned with him. So much so that the president even gave remarks at a rally for
Tom Wolf the day prior to the election. The goal of the visit by the president was to drive
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up election turnout in key areas for the Wolf campaign (Field, 2014). The result seemed
to positively affect Wolf as he cruised to a nine-point victory over the incumbent. This is
just one example of how a visit by the president can influence a midterm gubernatorial
election. The question then becomes is this impact similar to the impact a presidential
visit has in general or is it nothing more than an exception?
In scholarly research, the effect that a president has on gubernatorial elections has
only been addressed in passing. This is because current scholarship does not directly
examine this phenomenon but rather looks at the strategic motivation behind whether a
president campaigns for fellow members of his party. One of the reasons why
gubernatorial candidates and elections need to be studied is that states and governors
matter. (Squire and Moncrief 2013) States matter because on issues such as taxes and
social services, the state has the power to change many things, which could drastically
alter a person’s daily life. Knowing what factors might influence the election of the state
executive office is particularly important because they have the ability to sign or veto
laws. This is increasingly true, as the gridlock within Congress has strengthened the
ability and necessity of states to write the laws and solve problems. In addition, a large
number of states have unified government, which makes the process of passing
legislation easier. Another reason for this research is that it will directly address the effect
that a national figure such as the president can have on a statewide election of a
gubernatorial candidate that might impact the direction of policy.
Most of the attention given to the nature of presidential visits and midterm
gubernatorial elections has focused on the strategic calculations of a president in deciding
where to visit. Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) analyzed Senate elections and found
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two things. They first find that the president is strategic, meaning the president appears to
carefully choose where to visit in relation to the goals they seek to achieve. The second
finding is that visits have a positive impact on senate elections meaning that presidents
improve the ability of the members of their party to be elected. Based upon this finding,
two future paths of research were constructed, with one focusing on the strategic
calculation of the president and another focusing on the impact that a visit by the
president has. Yet since the 1991 publication by Cohen et al., research has focused on the
strategic calculation of presidents. This has left a tremendous gap in scholarship and as a
result, we do not understand how presidential visits impact elections. This gap needs to
be addressed in order to more fully understand if visits do actually matter or if a president
is potentially wasting their time. I fill this gap in the literature by testing visits by the
president and their impact on midterm gubernatorial elections. I then further examine
whether different types of visits have different impacts and how the partisanship of a state
affects the impact of a visit.
Building upon the foundation of previous literature, I have my own theoretical
expectations. I expect that presidential visits should have a positive impact on the
elections. However, not only do I expect a visit to have a positive impact, I also expect
that different types of visits will have different types of positive impact. Then based on
the theory of time commitment, which is a version of the cost-benefit analysis, I am able
to argue which type of visit should have the largest impact. Through which I argue that
rally visits should have the largest impact of the types of visits examined when visits are
separated out. This is because a rally visit has the largest time commitment for a president
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signifying it should also have the largest payoff for the president and candidate
represented in my results.
In my analysis, I use data from nine election cycles from 1982 to 2014, only
analyzing midterm election years to ensure comparability across elections. The dependent
variable I use is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. The
main independent variable that I use in my first model is total visits. I define total visits
as the summation of all the types of visits. Using total visits, I test my first hypothesis
that a presidential visit should positively impact a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial
election of the president's party. My main independent variables in my second model are
rally, fundraiser, and other visits. I use those variables to test my second hypothesis,
which is different types of visits by the president should have varying impacts on a
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election. My control variables include partisan
affiliation, the unemployment rate, median income, Electoral College votes in the
previous election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has
controlled the White House.
The results of my analysis demonstrate a few different things. First, total visits
have a consistently statistically significant relationship with vote share at a rather high
confidence level. This means that presidential visits increase the vote share received by a
midterm gubernatorial candidate. Second, when distinguishing among types of visits, the
results change. Rally visits are much more similar to total visits. Rally visits like total
visits are always statistically significant. Third, adding an interaction between visits and
partisanship, demonstrates the impact of a visit varies dependent upon on the partisan
makeup of a state. Meaning the impact of a visit to one state will not be the same as
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another state. Fourth, some control variables seem to have more significance than others
do. The two control variables I find to be the most significant include whether the
president won Electoral College votes in the previous election and the national approval
of the president in September of the midterm election year.
The remainder of this thesis contains the following. First, a literature review in
which I examine academic work that is related to my research question. This shows what
the evolution of work in this research field is and how my work will further prior research
as well as influence the continuation of research in the future. I then move to a theory
section in which I provide my expectations for my findings, particularly how I expect my
main independent variable to explain variation in my dependent variable. Following my
theory section, I will describe the data and methodology I used to examine my theory in
an effort to discover if I am able to reject the null hypothesis. After presenting my data
and methods, I summarize the key findings. I then conclude my paper by drawing further
conclusions as well as list implications and discuss directions for future research.

6

EXISTING LITERATURE
The role of presidential visits in state-level elections is addressed in existing
political science debates. Previous research on the effect that a president has on a
gubernatorial election began with Simon (1989). Simon examined gubernatorial elections
to see if they demonstrate a relationship between the approval of the president and votes
cast in gubernatorial elections. He demonstrates that citizen evaluation of presidential
performance has an influence on voting behavior in gubernatorial elections because
electoral accountability of the president is imposed through voting on gubernatorial
candidates from his party because of that party relationship. The key finding of the
analysis is that an evaluation of the presidents has a significant influence on the voting
behaviors in gubernatorial elections when controlling for factors such as party affiliation
of the incumbent governor.
Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) build upon Simon and this relationship by
looking at past approval and examining visits by presidents. They examined the
determinates and consequences of presidents campaigning in midterm Senate elections.
They argued that presidential campaigning is strategically based on presidential
popularity and the competitiveness of the electoral race meaning that a president looks to
visit areas with competitive elections where they also have their highest approval. This is
because the president’s time is valuable and they want to use that time to most benefit the
most candidates. This is why the president is strategic when determining which elections
to visit. By strategic calculation, they discuss that a president attempts to “campaign
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where their impact might make the most difference and when they are in the greatest
need of congressional support” (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991, 169). This signifies
that the strategic calculation of a presidential visit is used to describe the considerations,
which can lead to the president making the greatest difference.
Based on this logic, Cohen et al. sought to explain why a president campaigned in
any given midterm senate election. They define campaigning as whether the president
made an appearance with the Senate candidate in that candidate’s state. In their research,
they focus upon the competitiveness of the elections, presidential popularity, and the
percentage of legislative losses last election through which they make two key
discoveries. Their first discovery confirms their expectation that campaigning by the
president is strategic, meaning presidents strategically decide when, where, and for whom
to campaign (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991). The second finding is that when the
president does get involved in an election, the visits the president makes has a positive
impact on the candidate (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991). These findings lead to two
tracks in the trajectory of future research when looking at the visits by the president.
From this point, future research could have looked at the strategic calculations of a
president to visit a certain election or second it could look more into the impact of a
president’s visit on that election.
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Simon 1989:
Evaluations of the president has an impact
on gubernatorial votes.

Cohen, Kreassa, and Hamman 1991:
Presidential campaigning is strategic and has
a positive impact on senate elections.

Research on the strategic calculation of
where a President visits

Research on Impacts of a visit by
President

Routh and Hoddie 2004:
Visits by the president is based on a
Strategic calculation designed to
maximize their partys electoral gains.

My Thesis

Sellers and Denton 2006:
The president makes more official visits
then campaigns visits.
Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty
2009:
A consideration of whether to visit a state
is the presidents own electoral ambitions.
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters 2011:
Different considerations by the president
lead to different types of visits.

Doherty 2012:
The main purpose of visits by a president
is to strengthen his own electoral ablity.
Figure 1

Summary Table of the evolution of Scholarship
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In the years since Cohen et al., the focus of the research has been on the strategic
calculations of a president to visit certain candidates and campaigns. Routh and Hoddie
(2004) narrow the discussion by looking only at the strategic calculation. They seek to
further understand what factors influence a president’s decision to visit a particular state
specifically during the midterm election for governors and members of Congress. Routh
and Hoddie look at the strategic calculation of the president based on things such as the
degree of party polarization in Congress, presidential scandals, the approval rating of the
president, and the distance of the state from Washington D.C. They find that the midterm
election behavior of a president is based on a strategic calculation designed to maximize
his gains in congress and in governorships by focusing visits primarily on competitive
campaigns. This finding that presidents travel to states where they have higher popularity
and where there are a higher number of competitive seats demonstrate a potential focus of
the president on committee or group visits which could allow the most amount of good in
the least amount of time.
Sellers and Denton (2006) further narrow the discussion as they seek to determine
how collective concerns about party interests and individual concerns about electoral
fortunes lead presidents to visit states leading up to the midterm elections. This is done by
making a simple distinction between official and campaign visits both of which the
president make with frequency. Based on this analysis, they find that presidents serving
between 1982 and 2002 made more official visits than campaign visits and the frequency
of each type of visit is dependent upon a range of state and national factors. One of these
factors they found is that presidents tend to visit states with more electoral votes, which
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demonstrates that a consideration of the president might be their own future electoral
ambitions.
This distinction in different types of visits leads Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters
(2011) to a different and more detailed division of the types of presidential visits. Lang et
al. argue that understanding the type of visit and what the president does on that visit
allows for a deeper exploration of presidential motivation. The differentiation between
types of visits is more complicated than the differentiation made by Sellers and Denton.
The types of visits that they identify include rally, fundraiser, and virtual visits. Rally
visits are when there is an event where the president speaks to a crowd with the purpose
of rallying supporters or encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits where
the president’s primary objective is to raise money for a candidate or candidates. Virtual
campaigning is where the president did not physically visit a location but had a live or
taped message for a group. They conclude that when aggregating visits together,
Electoral College votes and the previous state-level winning percentage of the president
in the state affect the probability of a visit. However, when looking at the different types
of visits, rally visits are used more often when presidents are more popular and when the
number of competitive races in a state is greater. Presidents are more likely to host a
fundraiser in a state when the number of Electoral College votes is higher but are less
likely to visit when there are fewer competitive races.
Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty (2009) build upon previous research by
examining how the strategic calculation of the president to help candidates from their
party relates to their own electoral ambitions. Eshbaugh-Soha et al. examine specifically
mid-term elections to see if the president is more concerned with improving their party’s
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candidates or with their own electoral ambitions. They argue that presidents have
multiple goals when they campaign in midterm elections, seeking not only to influence
individual races and affect the composition of Congress but also to increase their own
chances for reelection. The research found that the likelihood of visiting a state is based
on many factors. One example is that presidents tend to travel more to states with
vulnerable statewide offices and competitive House elections in order to help the
electoral fortunes of his party. Although a contributing factor to the likelihood of visiting
a state is based on their own electoral ambitions. This idea of presidential concern about
their own electoral ambitions is often referred to as the permanent campaign.
The permanent campaign is based on the belief that rather than the president’s
primary concern with visits being to help the parties’ candidates the primary role of visits
could be to further the president’s own electoral hopes. Doherty (2012) built upon the
concept of the permanent campaign (Caddell 1976, Blumenthal 1980, and Tepas 2000) as
he looks to see what extent do presidents respond to electoral initiatives throughout their
terms in office. He argues that the president’s efforts in visiting other candidates are
related to their own personal electoral concerns and how that affects the ways, in which
decisions are made in the White House. The theory behind it being that the president
makes strategic choices, which in turn reveal their priorities as president. The analysis
concludes that the strategies and efforts of the president are often to strengthen his hand.
However, the president’s strategies to strengthen his hand also can undermine his role as
a unifying national leader, heighten public cynicism, and limit prospects for bipartisan
compromise.
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In a departure from the others, Mellen and Searles (2013) look to see if some of
the same factors that lead to a visit at the state level also apply to the district level. The
authors argue that much of the existing research explains why presidents devote their
limited resources during a midterm election but do not attempt to explain a presidential
visit to a particular congressional district. The factors they look at include the amount of
competitive districts in a state, district popularity, open seats, and other types of
competitive elections in close proximities such as senate and gubernatorial elections.
Their findings suggest that although presidents do indeed behave rationally when they
make appearances for their co-partisans, visits are more likely to occur when there are
multiple higher-level competitive races in a district, and presidents are more likely to go
where they are already popular (Mellen and Searles 2013).
All of the research that I discussed has painted a clear picture of the evolution of
research related to presidential visits. This line of study about visits by the president was
begun with the research of Cohen et al. as they examined presidential visits and midterm
senate election. They demonstrate how the president is strategic and that visits have a
positive impact. However as demonstrated in this literature review and as visually
demonstrated in Table 1, all of the subsequent research has been related to the first
finding of Cohen et al. about the president being strategic with their visits. The research
on presidential visits has focused on the strategic calculation of where the president visits,
in so doing it has left research on the impact of those visits back in 1991.
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
The concept of impact is fundamental to this project as I seek to understand the
impact of a visit by the president on a midterm gubernatorial election. An impact is the
ability of the president to harm or help the ability of the members of their party to be
elected. Specifically, I seek to understand the impact of a visit by the president on the
candidate of the president’s party in a midterm gubernatorial election. Impacts are
important to understand because they are the consequence felt by an action. Both actors,
the gubernatorial candidate, and the president feel the consequence based on the impact
of a visit. It is felt by the candidates because either the impact is positive and increases
their chances of being elected governor or the impact is negative and decreases their
chances of being elected governor. The president feels the impact of a visit in two ways.
First, the president either helps or harms their party electorally, particularly in that state in
which they visit. The second consequence felt by the president is based upon self-interest,
especially in the current era of partisan divide as governors of states of the opposition
party challenge much of what a president does.
This has been seen during the Obama administration as Republican governors
have challenged all sorts of things. Examples are the Affordable Healthcare Act, the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals executive order, and even the president’s stance
on Syrian refugees. Impacts are important to understand in two different ways. Thus, the
consequence felt by the president on how much opposition is received by these governors
is dependent upon on how many are elected or reelected. An impact can be measured in
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two separate but important ways first statistical significance shows whether the impact, in
fact, matters and at what level it matters. Second to see if there is an economic impact of
visits, meaning to what degree visits provide a benefit or impairment to those candidates
that president’s visit. Thus, I seek to examine the impact presidential visits have on the
midterm gubernatorial elections.
I expect that a visit by a president should have a positive impact on those
elections that the president chooses to participate in. I have this expectation because if
campaigning had a negative or no impact then over time it would have lead presidents
away from it and instead to find another use of their time. As the president has only a
finite amount time in the position, the president tries to use their time in the way that will
most benefit their goals. This is also illustrated in the strategic calculation by a president
of where to visit. Since the president spends time on this consideration as demonstrated in
previous research, if the visit was not beneficial, it seems that the president would stop
these visits in an effort to find a way to promote their agenda. I also argue this
expectation as previous literature has found that visits positively impact elections such as
Cohen et al. found with Senate elections.
For these reasons, I expect in general that a visit should have a positive effect on
behalf of candidates. I expect a presidential visit to have a positive effect because
presidential visits increase turnout. This is because presidential visits should typically
result in a higher vote share for gubernatorial candidates of their party by helping
reestablish the enthusiasm among their key constituencies who got them elected to turn
out to vote for the candidate that they are visiting. For example, as discussed previously,
Tom Wolf received visits in the 2014 midterm elections from President Obama so that he
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could help increase the enthusiasm among African-American voters in key urban areas to
vote. This phenomenon should be particularly helpful to a candidate in the midterm
election cycle. This is as midterm elections typically have a lower participation rate than
the general election cycle so this increase among their key constituencies should have an
even larger effect in a midterm gubernatorial election.
Hypothesis 1: A presidential visit should positively impact a candidate’s midterm
gubernatorial election.
As pointed out in previous research, there are many different types of visits and
many different ways to categorize visits. This is important to recognize because since not
all visits are the same, it is clear that the impact of each type of presidential visit might
also vary. For example, Sellers and Denton (2006) separate visits into two categories,
which are official visits and campaign visits. They consider official visits to be visits that
are non-campaign visits that are being used to strengthen the president’s own electoral
support in states. Campaign visits are considered visits being used to boost the candidate
of the president’s party.
Related to Sellers and Denton, another work that also separated out visit types is
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) who have a more complicated and intricate visit
structure. The identified visit types include rally, fundraiser, and virtual. Rally visits are
an event where the president speaks to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or
encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits that the president’s primary
objective is to raise money for a candidate or candidates. While virtual campaigning is
when the president did not physically visit a location, but had a live or taped message for
a group. However, these are just a few of the ways that visits can be categorized.
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I argue using a similar visit structure involving rally visits, fundraiser visit, and
other visits. I argue that each visit type has a different impact, like each type of visit, has
a different and unique predictor of when that visit type would occur. As with my first
hypothesis, I argue that visits have a significant and positive impact, although I argue that
different types of visits should have different degrees of impact. I argue that these
different degrees of impact of visits can be seen through the application of the theory of
time commitment by the president. Through this theory, I am able to distinguish the
theoretical expectations of why some types of visits should be more impactful than other
types of visits.
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters describe the theory of time commitment by the
president as they use it to distinguish between their dependent variables in hopes to see
where presidents are more likely to visit. I argue that the theory of time commitment by
the president allows for a theoretical distinguishing between the main independent
variables to see what type of visit gives the largest impact for a candidate. According to
the theory of time commitment by the president, rally visits are the most time-consuming
event for a president and as a result, they should have the highest degree of payoff for a
candidate. Next fundraisers require less presidential time, planning, and coordination than
a rally and should have the second highest degree of payoff. Finally, virtual visits have an
even lower time commitment than both a rally and a fundraiser so the degree of payoff
should be the least of the three types of visits. The only adaptation I make to the theory of
time commitment by the president presented by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters is
changing virtual visits to other visits. In so doing, I expect the lower time commitment to
remain the same, also the lower degree of payoff.
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Based on the theoretical expectation of time commitment by a president as a
proxy for an electoral payoff for gubernatorial candidates, I argue the largest coefficient
should be seen with rally visits. I argue that the next largest coefficient should be seen
with fundraiser visits. Moreover, I argue that the smallest coefficient should be seen with
other visits. This signifies that I expect that different types of visits should have different
impacts. Nevertheless, it seems that if the president chooses where to campaign
strategically, then different types of partisan audiences should react differently to a visit
from the president.
Hypothesis 2: Different types of visits by the president should have varying
impacts on a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election.
Hypothesis 2a: Rally visits should have the largest positive impact on a
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election.
Hypothesis 2b: A fundraiser visit should be the second largest positive impact on
a candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election.
Hypothesis 2c: Other visits should be the smallest positive impact on a
candidate’s midterm gubernatorial election.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
To test these hypotheses, I analyze all midterm elections between 1982 to the
present. As not all states hold their gubernatorial elections in the midterm election cycle,
typically 361 states held their elections with the exception of 2010 in which, there were
372 elections held. Keeping this in mind, I operationalized each of my variables in the
following ways:
In previous scholarship, there are many ways to measure an impact. These
different ways are important to discuss because different approaches could lead to
differences in the findings across studies. Although impact can be measured in many
ways, the focus of this thesis is using vote share as a measure of impact. For example,
Peverill and Fastnow (1994) measure impact as a binary variable dependent upon if the
president’s party wins the seat or not. Leyden and Borrelli (1995) measure impact as the
percentage of two-party vote share of the party of the president. Nagel and McNulty
(1996) use the measure of the percentage of total vote share of the party of the president
for impact. However, Mellen and Searles (2013) look at the difference in the vote share

1

The states hold elections their midterm gubernatorial elections in the midterm election cycle include
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
2

The exception of 2010 is Utah, which held a special election in the midterm year to elect a new governor
to fulfill the remainder of Governor Jon Huntsman Jr's term. This was following the appointment of
Governor Huntsman to become United States Ambassador to China by President Obama.
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between the president’s party and the non-president’s party as a measure of impact.
Noting these measures and how visits have been measured allows for the use of
scholarship to inform and structure the operationalization of the variables in this project.
The dependent variable is the vote share of the candidate from the president’s
party. This allows me to see if there is a positive or negative impact regardless of the
outcome of an election. I operationalize this variable as the percentage of total vote share
of the party of the president, similar to Nagel and McNulty (1996). I measure this
variable by looking at the percentage of the total vote obtained by the candidate of the
president's party.
The main independent variables included in the model include types of visits by
the president:
Visits have been measured in various ways throughout the literature. It is
important to note the differences in how they have been measured because the differences
in how visits have been measured may cause the differences in the findings across the
various studies. When looking at presidential visits, Cohen et al. (1991) defines a visit as
whether or not the president campaigned in the midterm senate election. Routh and
Hoddie (2004) chose to use the number of presidential campaign visits to a state between
August 1st and November’s Election Day. Eshbaugh-Soha and Nichlson-Crotty (2009)
use the Cohen method, using a nominal level measure of whether or not a president
campaigns in a state during a midterm election. Mellen and Searles (2013) measure the
number of visits to a district in a midterm election year. The rest of literature seems to
follow one of these methods on the measurements of a visit.
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As discussed above, the concept of visits has been separated in some of the most
recent literature. Measurement of visits when separating them out into different types of
visits allows for further examination and further testing. For example, Sellers and Denton
(2006) measure visits by how often the president visited one of the 50 states in the
twenty-two-month period preceding each midterm election, but they broke it down into
two categories, which are official, and campaign. Official visits are visits that are noncampaign visits that are being used to strengthen his own electoral support in some states
while campaign visits are visits being used to boost the candidate of the president’s party.
Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) use an even more in-depth visit structure. They
count a specific type of visit made by the president in a state during the midterm election
season, which is defined as August to the election. The types of visits defined by Lang,
Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) include rally, fundraiser, or virtual. Rally visits are an
event where the president spoke to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or
encouraging citizens to vote. Fundraiser visits are visits where the president’s primary
objective was to raise money for a candidate. Virtual campaigning is when the president
did not physically visit a location but had a live or taped message for a group.
A visit in this article is measured by the number of presidential visits to a state
which there was mention of the gubernatorial candidate between August 1st and Election
Day such as done by Routh and Hoddie (2004), plus the number of explicit campaign
visits in the midterm election year prior to August as done by Mellen and Searles (2013).
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I obtained this information by using data from The American Presidency Project3. First,
there are “total” visits, which is the summation of all of the various types of visits.
Based on the research done by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011) it appears
that there are three major types of visits by the president. Those types of visits are rally
visits, fundraiser visits, and virtual, or what I will call other types of visits. First, as
discussed by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), a “rally” is defined as an event where
the president spoke to a crowd with the purpose of rallying supporters or encouraging
citizens to vote. A “rally” was typically noted in the title of the president’s remarks for
coding purposes. Second, as identified by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), a
“fundraiser” is defined as a visit where the president’s primary objective was to raise
money for a candidate. The president would often make formal remarks at such events
and this type of event is often times connected to a breakfast, lunch, or dinner. Third, as
identified by Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), is what they call “virtual”
campaigning, which I am going to call “other” visits. These “other” visits include things
such as exchanges with reporters with the governor, interviews the president does for
governors, official visits with the governor in attendance, official press releases about a
governor from the office of a president, press briefings in which a governor is explicitly
discussed, and satellite events.
To mirror past studies, my model includes the following independent variables in
my study as control variables that each has been found to impact elections:

3

The types of visits that the American Presidency project are candidate breakfast, candidate dinner,
candidate fundraiser, candidate lunch, candidate rally, candidate reception, candidate lunch, committee
breakfast, committee dinner, committee fundraiser, committee lunch, committee rally, committee reception,
exchange with reporters/interviews, mention of candidates in attendance, as well as discussion of
candidates in press briefing, and satellite/virtual events.
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Partisan Affiliation: Following the lead of Folke and Snyder (2012), partisan
affiliation is the partisan division of seats in the state’s lower house. For my model, I
specifically use the percentage of seats in the lower state house from the president’s
party. I obtained this information from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty
Research (UKCPR) National Welfare Data. This seems particularly important to control
for, as existing scholarship shows how partisanship is a determinate for a candidate’s
electoral outcome. I expect that as the partisan affiliation of the president’s party
increases the vote share of the candidate from the president’s party will increase.
Unemployment rate: The model also includes the rate of unemployment at the
state level. I obtained this information from the UKCPR National Welfare Data, which
uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
program. This seems particularly important to control for, as demonstrated to a
significant factor in previous scholarship for example Bardwell (2005) who were able to
show unemployment is a determinate of voting behaviors in gubernatorial elections. I
expect that as the rate of unemployment increases the vote share of the candidate from
the president’s party will decrease.
Median income: The model includes the median income at the state level. The
median income data is in current dollars, which means the income included in the model
for a person, household, or family adjusted for inflation. This data comes from the U.S.
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements.
This seems particularly important to control for, as Atkeson and Partin (1995) discovered
governors, as state executives, are held accountable for perceived state economic
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conditions. I expect that as the median income increases the vote share of the candidate
from the president’s party will also increase.
Won Electoral College votes in the Previous Election: The model includes a
binary variable that is coded as a “1” if the president won Electoral College votes for that
state the previous election while it is coded as a “0” if the president did not win Electoral
College votes in the previous election4. This is important to control for, as it allows for
controlling for states in which the president’s party should naturally do better. I expect
that if the president won Electoral College votes in a state, the vote share of the candidate
from the president’s party will be larger.
Presidential approval: The model includes presidential approval data, which I
obtained from Lang, Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011). They used the national approval of
the president in September of the midterm election year, as registered by the Gallup Poll.
This data I obtained from the question that they asked “Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that president [insert name] is handling his job as president?” They cite their data
as taken from Ragsdale (2007) and the Roper iPoll database. This seems particularly
important to control for, as Simon (1989) was able to specifically demonstrate the
relationship between a citizens' evaluation of the president and voting behaviors in
gubernatorial elections. Based upon this finding, presidential approval becomes an
important aspect of the modeling. I expect that as the presidential approval increases, the
vote share of the candidate from the president’s party will also increase.

4

There are only two states in which Electoral College votes are devisable within the same state these two
states are Maine and Nebraska. However only once in the observed period are is a state’s electoral votes
divided between two different candidates. This occurrence is in 2008 when President Obama won one of
Nebraska’s five potential electoral votes.
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Number of Years the president’s Party has controlled the White House: The
model includes a variable that I coded for how many consecutive years the president’s
party has held the Presidency. This seems particularly important to control for, as
scholarship has shown a fatigue effect for the president’s party meaning the longer the
president’s party controls the white house the greater the electoral losses his party tends
to have in other elections. I expect that as the number of years the president’s party has
controlled the white house increases, the vote share of the candidate from the president’s
party will decrease.
Table 1

Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std.
Deviation

Min

Max

The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial
Candidate from the president’s Party

0.444

0.109

0

0.734

Total Visits

1.182

1.925

0

11

Rally Visits

0.191

0.485

0

3

Fundraiser Visits

0.308

0.697

0

6

Other Visits

0.683

1.331

0

9

Partisanship

0.468

0.19

0

0.92

Unemployment rate

6.164

2.269

2.3

15.6

Median income

37677.37

13171.03

16464 76165

Won State in the previous election

0.691

0.463

0

1

Presidential Approval

50.778

10.283

38

65

Number of Years President’s Party has
held the White House

4.667

2.67

2

10

Observations

325
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Table 1 shows each of the descriptive statistics for all of the variables described in
the data section above. By examining these statistics, more context can be given to both
my data and the results of my regressions. For example, my data analysis contains 325
observations. This is important because it signifies the central limit theorem.
In Table 1, each of the variables has its mean, standard deviation, min, and max.
These statistics describe multiple things, for example when discussing total visits it has a
mean of 1.182 meaning that out of all midterm gubernatorial elections, the president on
average visits his candidate just a little over one time. However, because the minimum is
zero it is seen that there are elections in which the president does not campaign for the
candidate from his party. On the other hand, the maximum is 11 and thus it is seen that
out of the nine observed elections cycles, the president has dedicated multiple visits to
certain candidates, one of whom the president visited 11 times over the course of the
observed election cycle.
When looking at my dependent variable, the vote share of the gubernatorial
candidate from the president’s party, there a couple of descriptive observations to note.
The mean of vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party is 0.444
meaning that out of all midterm elections in the data set the average vote share of the
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party on average is 44.4 percent. The
minimum is zero, and because the maximum is 0.734, that means that over the nine
observed elections cycles the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the
president’s party ranges from 0 percent to 73.4 percent. The standard deviation is 0.109
or 10.9% of the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party.
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This type of observation can also be made for the other main independent
variables like other visits, which have a mean of 0.683 with a minimum of zero and a
maximum of nine. This makes other visits the most common type of visit when they are
separated out into types, which makes sense in conjunction with the theoretical
expectation I would expect. This is based on the time commitment by the president as
explained earlier. Because other visits have an even lower time commitment than both a
rally and a fundraiser, it should be easier to employ these types of visits and thus they
should be the most frequently seen type of visit. Next fundraiser visits have a mean of
0.308 with a minimum of zero and a maximum of six, which once again makes sense in
conjunction with the theoretical expectation I would expect.
This is because of the time commitment by the president. Fundraisers may require
less presidential time than rally visits but more than other visits so it should be expected
to happen the second most following other visits which have the lowest time
commitment. Then there are rally visits, which have a mean of 0.191 with a minimum of
zero, and a maximum of three, which makes sense in conjunction with the theoretical
expectation. This is because rally visits are the most time-consuming event for a president
and as a result, these should probably be the fewest type of visit observed. Though in the
regression analysis, they should have the highest degree of a payoff since rallies are the
most publicly visible events and they maximize the public exposure of the president.
Methodology
With these variables, in order to test my hypotheses, I will employ two sets of
models. The first set tests my first hypothesis while the second set tests the second
hypothesis. In order to employ my models, the methodology I will use is first a cross-
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sectional regression specification, which allows for a simple ordinary least squares
model. The use of the cross-sectional regression allows an examination of the existence
and magnitude of the effects of visits on vote share regardless of time and place.
A potential issue with the cross-sectional specifications that it could potentially
suffer from omitted variable bias based on the amount of variation being explained by the
variables in the model. 5 This demonstrates a need for further examination to ensure
consistency and reliability in results of the regression. As it seems apparent that omitted
variable bias is prevalent as the multiple regression is clearly missing relevant control
variables. In addition, because these omitted factors are not adequately controlled for in
the cross-sectional specification that could lead to endogeneity in the results. One of the
ways to control for omitted variable bias and to ensure there is not endogeneity is to use a
panel model. Thus, I will employ a panel regression specification in order to help control
for omitted variable bias.6 By employing both specifications, the results can be examined

5

The cross-sectional regression specification models are defined as the following:

Model 1:
Yi = β0 + β1·TVi + β2·PAi + β3·IVPAi + β4·UnRi + β5·MIi + β6·ECi + β7·PAi + β8·PPi + ℮
Model 2:
Yi = β0 + β1·RVi + β2·FVi + β3·OVi + β4·PAi + β3·IVPAi + β5·UnRi + β6·MIi + β7·ECi + β8·PAi +
β9·PPi + ℮
where Y represents vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, TV represents
“Total” Visits, RV represents “Rally” Visits, FV represents “Fundraiser” Visits, OV represents “Other”
Visits, PA represents Partisan Affiliation, IVPA represents an Interaction between Visits and Partisan
Affiliation which is conceptualized by multiplying a type of visit with the partisan affiliation measure, UnR
represents Unemployment Rate, MI represents Median Income, EC represents Won Electoral College votes
in Previous Election, PA represents presidential Approval, and PP represents Years the president’s Party
has controlled the White House.
6

The panel regression specification models with fixed effects are defined as:

Model 1:
Yi = β0 + β1·TVit + β2·PAit + β3·IVPAit + β4·UnRit + β5·MIit + β6·ECit + β7·PAit + β8·PPit + ℮
Model 2:
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for consistency both in terms of statistical and economic significance. A panel regression
specification allows the data as a whole to be used without omitting time and place,
which allows for the creation of a baseline to see how visits effect the expectation vs. the
actual vote share. Thus, the data set is a panel data set when the panel variable is set to
the state and the time variable is set to the year of the election, which allows for the use
of a panel regression.
This regression type also offers other advantages over the cross-sectional
regression such as being able to control for effects between units, in this case, states,
and/or effects between time points, in this case, different years. As discussed by Lang,
Rottinghaus, and Peters (2011), the proper type of panel regression model to use in this
case is fixed effects as this type of panel regression model allows for the creation of
parameters, in this case, individual states, and is appropriate because it appears there are
effects of the individual state characteristics that could be related. Thus, fixed-effects and
not a random effects model is employed as it examines state-level variables that may be
correlated to vote share. Another reason for the use of a fixed effects model is the
theoretical belief that the results are not subject to random variation and that they do not
vary across time.

Yi = β0 + β1·RVit + β2·FVit + β3·OVit + β4·PAit + β5·IVPAit + β6·UnRit + β7·MIit + β8·ECit + β9·PAit
+ β10·PPit + ℮
where Y represents: The vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, TV represents
“Total” Visits, RV represents “Rally” Visits, FV represents “Fundraiser” Visits, OV represents “Other”
Visits, PA represents Partisan Affiliation, IVPA represents an Interaction between Visits and Partisan
Affiliation which is conceptualized by multiplying a type of visit with the partisan affiliation measure, UnR
represents Unemployment Rate, MI represents Median Income, EC represents Won Electoral College votes
in Previous Election, PA represents presidential Approval, and PP represents Years the president’s Party
has controlled the White House.
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Also, I believe that it could be important to include in my model an interaction
between visits and partisanship to further enhance the understanding of the impact of a
visit. By adding this interaction with partisanship, I will able to see what the impact of a
visit will be at varying levels of partisanship, which I measure as the percentage of seats
in the lower state house from the president’s party. Based on this analysis I will see in
which states visits are more effective. Also, I will see what the expected impact of a visit
will be at any level of partisanship. For example, this analysis could demonstrate the
effects of a visit at lower levels of partisanship in the president’s party: perhaps the visits
effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party at this level is negative. Perhaps
if there are higher levels of partisanship of the president’s party the effect of a visit on the
vote share of the candidate from their party is nonexistent. These findings will further
demonstrate the impact of a visit and how a president can maximize the effect of a visit
and the impact for their candidate.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results
In order to view the impact of presidential visits, my results section will proceed
in two parts. First, I examine to what extent a visit by the president changes the vote
share of a candidate from their party leads in Table 2. Second, when distinguishing
among types of visits, an examination of Table 3 demonstrates what types of visits by the
president do impact a candidate from his party. This two-stage approach allows us to first
understand how presidential visits matter in Table 2. Table 3 then builds upon this
understanding by distinguishing among types of visits to see what types of visits matter
and which do not. After a discussion of which results in these tables are significant, I then
turn to an interpretation of the results. I will then discuss the findings and why control
variables may or may not be significant and explanatory factors, and how this might
depend on the employed model specification.
Table 2 presents the results of my empirical analysis when the main independent
variable is total visits or when I summed all campaign visit activity together. Table 2 is a
summary table of the impact of total visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial
candidate from the president’s party. Although each column is similar, some differences
are important to note in order to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the
consistency and validity of the findings. Thus, each of the columns represented by a
different model specification will be discussed.
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Table 2

Summary Table of Impact of Total Visits

Dependent Variable: The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial Candidate from the president’s
Party

Constant

CrossSectional

Cross-Sectional with
total visits Interaction

Panel with total visits
Interaction

0.383***

0.361***

0.284***

(0.06)

(0

(0.064)

.062)
Total Visits

0.004**

0.023***

0.021***

(0.002)

(0.009)

(0.007)

0.024

0.059*

0.1***

(0.037)

(0.044)

(0.042)

-0.0382***

-0.038***

(0.0159)

(0.013)

-0.005*

-0.004*

0.001

(0.0032)

(0.003)

(0.004)

3.68E-07

4.37e-07

6.78E-07*

(5.37E-07)

(5.35e-07)

(5.30E-07)

0.035***

0.035**

0.03**

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.014)

0.001**

.001**

0.002***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Number of Years President’s
Party has held the White House

-0.005**

-0.005**

-0.003

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

Observations

325

325

325

State-by-Year Fixed Effects Panel
Analysis

No

No

Yes

Prob > F

0.000***

0.000***

0.002***

Partisanship

(Total Visits)*( Partisanship)

Unemployment rate

Median income

Won State in the previous election

Presidential Approval
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R2

0.061

0.071

0.079

Notes: The dependent variable is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the
president’s party, which is the percentage of total vote share obtained by the candidate of
the party of the president. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at p < .01
** indicates statistical significance at p < .05
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10
The first column uses the cross-sectional model with all campaign visit activity
summed together. The results of this model show that a total visit is a significant factor.
Along with total visits, significant variables in the specification include the
unemployment rate, whether a president won a state in the previous election, presidential
approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the White House. This
means that each of these variables is a predictive factor of vote share. Along with what is
significant, it is also important to note what is found to not be significant, such as
partisanship, and median income. This tells us that in this specification the things that
affect the vote share of a gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party include visits
by the president, unemployment rate, whether a president won a state in the previous
election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the
White House. This demonstrates that there could be a statistical method to predict and
potentially influence the vote share of those candidates. From this, we can infer that
certain factors influence the voting behaviors of the electorate more than others do. For
example, it is seen that the unemployment rate (-.005) has an influence five times greater
on vote share than presidential approval (.001). This means a one unit change in the
presidential approval causes a smaller effect than a one unit change in unemployment
rate.
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In the second column, there is a cross-sectional model with the interaction term
when all campaign visits are summed together. The results of this model show that total
visits are once again a significant factor. Along with total visits, other things in this
model that are found to be significant include partisanship, the interaction term,
unemployment rate, won state in the previous election, presidential approval, and the
number of years the president’s party has held the White House. Along with what is
significant, it is also important to note what is not found to be significant. In this model, it
is seen that once again median income is found to not be significant. This tells us that
when adding the interaction between visits and partisanship that while the significance of
visits remains constant, a new factor gains significance. This factor is partisanship, which
is part of the interaction, which appears too significant as a whole.
In the third column, impact of total visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial
candidate from the president’s party, the panel model with fixed effect that includes the
interaction term when all campaign visits are summed together. The results demonstrate
that total visits are once again significant. Along with total visits, other significant
variables include partisanship, the interaction term, median income, won a state in the
previous election, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has
held the White House.
Along with what is significant, it is also important to note what is found to not be
significant, which in this model is found to be only unemployment rate. This tells us that
when the interaction remains constant and when the panel specification is used instead of
the cross-sectional specification, visits are still significant. However, it demonstrates that
while employing this specification the other factors that contribute to vote share differ as
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the unemployment rate and the number of years the president’s party has held the White
House are not significant while median income does matter.
Table 2 tells us that a presidential visit provides a vote share boost for the
candidate that they campaign for. These results support my first hypothesis as well my
expectations for the control variables. Other factors differ depending on the model
specification but each factor is significant in at least one specification. This variation in
the significance of control variables could potentially be a weakness of the utilized data
when the panel specification is employed, which I will discuss in further detail in the
discussion section. However, in order to determine whether my second hypothesis and
expectations of the control variables are correct, I need to examine the results in Table 3
to see if different types of visits have different expectations.
Table 3 presents the results of my empirical analysis when distinguishing between
the different types of visits. The results demonstrate that different types of visits are
associated with variation in vote share. Table 3 also presents a summary of the impacts of
different visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party.
Although each column is similar, some differences are important to note in order to allow
for a more comprehensive understanding of the consistency and validity of the findings.
Thus, each of the columns represented by a different model specification will be
discussed.
The first column uses a cross-sectional model with all campaign visits split out
into rally, fundraiser, and other visits. When running this model, rally is the only type of
visit that is significant while fundraiser and other visits are found to be not significant.
Along with rally visits, other variables in this model that are found to be significant
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include unemployment rate, won state in the previous election, presidential approval, and
the number of years the president’s party has held the White House. These results allow
for a good baseline model specification upon which the other model specifications can be
compared to see how those differences can be explained by both the data and the
analytical approach.
Table 3

Summary Table of Impact of Split Visits

Dependent Variable: The Vote Share of the Gubernatorial Candidate from the president’s
Party

Constant

Rally Visits

Fundraiser Visits

Other Visits

Partisanship

(Rally Visits)*(Partisanship)

Panel with
Panel with fundraiser
rally visits visits
Interaction Interaction

Panel with
other visits
Interaction

CrossSectional

Panel

0.381***

0.305*** 0.293***

0.295

0.292***

(0.06)

(0.058)

(0.062)

(0.061)

(0.06)

0.014*

0.016*

0.066***

0.018*

0.016*

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.022)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.008

-0.0003

-9.82e-06

0.036

-0.002

(0.009)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.037)

(0.011)

0.001

-0.001

-.0002

0.00002

0.019**

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.009)

0.026

0.067**

.082**

0.076**

0.089**

(0.037)

(0.035)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.04)

-0.11**
(0.049)

(Fundraiser
Visits)*(Partisanship)
(Other Visits)*(Partisanship)

-0.086*
(0.077)
-0.037**
(0.015)
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Unemployment rate

Median income

-0.005*

-0.0004

0.0001**

-0.0004

0.0001

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

3.60E-07

5.71E-07 6.87e07***
(5.36E-

6.28e-07

5.49E-07

(5.42e-07)

(5.24E-07)

(5.39E-07)

07)

(5.51e-07)

0.034***

0.028**

0.026

0.027**

0.027**

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.001**

0.002**

0.002***

0.002***

0.002***

(0.000665) (0.001)

(0.0006)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Number of Years President’s
Party has held the White House

-0.005**

-0.003

-0.003

-0.004

-0.003

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

Observations

325

325

325

325

325

State-by-Year Fixed Effects
Panel Analysis

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Prob > F

0.002***

0.001*** 0.001***

0.001***

0.000***

R2

0.064

.072

0.077

0.077

Won State in previous election

Presidential Approval

0.081

Notes: The dependent variable is vote share of the gubernatorial candidate from the
president’s party, which is the percentage of total vote share obtained by the candidate of
the party of the president. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at p < .01
** indicates statistical significance at p < .05
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10
In the second column of Table 3, the impact of split visits on the vote share of the
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, the panel model with fixed effects
includes all campaign visits split out into the rally, fundraiser, and other visits. When
running this model, rally is the only type of visit that is found to be significant while
fundraiser and other visits are found to be insignificant. Along with rally visits, other
variables in this model that are significant include partisanship, won state in the previous
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election, and presidential approval. The variables found in this model to be insignificant
include the unemployment rate, the number of years the president’s party has held the
White House, and median income. However, when the panel specification is employed,
the unemployment rate and the number of years the president’s party has held the White
House are not significant, while partisanship is significant. From which we can really
infer from this model is that when looking at rally visits are consistently significant and
positive while the other types of visits are consistently not significantly.
In the third column of Table 3, the impact of total visits on the vote share of the
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party, are the results from the panel model
with fixed effects, which includes all campaign visits split out as well as an interaction
term that uses rally visits with partisanship. When running this model, the rally
partisanship interaction is significant as demonstrated in figure 3. However, fundraiser
and other visits are found to be not significant. Along with rally visits, other variables in
this model that are found to be significant include the unemployment rate, median
income, presidential approval, and the number of years the president’s party has held the
White House. The only control variable that is not significant is whether the president
won the state in the previous election. This tells us that rally visits seem to have a strong
interaction with partisanship. From the results, it is also seen that the control variables
also matter more when controlling for the interaction between rally visits and
partisanship.
However, the fourth and fifth columns in Table 3, appear to be similar. Each
column represents the impact of split visits on the vote share of the gubernatorial
candidate from the president’s party, both with panel models with fixed effects which
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includes all campaign visits split out and includes an interaction between fundraiser visits
(in the fourth column) or other visits (in the fifth column) and partisanship. In the fourth
column, the interaction between the fundraiser visits and partisanship is significant as
demonstrated in figure 4. Then in the fifth column, it is seen that the interaction between
the other visits and partisanship is not significant. However, the control variables that are
found to be significant in both of these model specifications include partisanship, the
interaction term, won state in the previous election, and presidential approval. The
variables found to not be significant include unemployment rate, median income, and the
number of years the president’s party has held the White House. From these models, we
can infer that rally visits are significant not only in these two models but also over the
course of all five models. With that being said, over the course of these models, there is
consistency in the control variables, which heavily relate to the specification in column
two.
Discussion
The estimates for the models displayed above in Tables 2 and 3 present numerous
findings that are worth identifying. Table 2 presents analyses for the findings related to
elections using total visits while the analyses for the findings for elections when
distinguishing among types of visits is in Table 3. In general, this research suggests there
can be a vote share boost from a presidential visit that is real and can affect the outcome
of elections. Based on the data analysis, the findings include that visits generally have a
positive impact on vote share. In fact, visits by presidents help the candidates of their
parties by increasing the vote share that the candidates of the president’s party receive
which improves their opportunity for both election and reelection. This demonstrates that
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when a president strategically decides when, where and for whom to campaign for, their
efforts do in fact pay off which demonstrates external validity to the findings of Cohen et
al. However, once an interaction term is introduced to see the relationship between visits
and partisanship, the impact of a visit in terms of both its significance and its magnitude
is seen to be dependent upon the partisan makeup of a state. Third, I find that other
control variables have unique and differing impacts on a candidates’ vote share.
Focusing on the total visits models, it is clear that certain determinates are
consistently significant which demonstrates that there are certain factors that are more
important than other factors. Table 2 shows determinates of the vote share of the
gubernatorial candidate from the president’s party. First, when focusing on total visits or
the summation, of all the different types of visits, in all three of the model specifications,
visits are always significant and consistently positive when not accounting for the
interaction term. The nature of the positive relationship tells us that there is a direct
relationship between visits and vote share, which was the expected relationship based on
my hypothesis and theory. This signifies an important finding that candidates of the
president’s party that receive visits from the president do receive a higher percentage of
vote share than they would have if they had they not received a visit by the president.
This means that candidates that receive a visit from the president are more likely to be
elected than those who do not receive a visit.
When interpreting the coefficient based on an examination of the coefficient of
total visits in the cross-sectional model column, when there is a visit by a president to a
gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share received by that
gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 0.4%. The finding that the average
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visit improves a candidate’s vote share by around nearly 0.4%. percentage points on
average is important because it suggests that this vote share boost from a presidential visit
is real and can affect the outcome of elections if enough attention is paid by a candidate.
In application, when looking at just the close gubernatorial election states from the 2014midterm elections and focusing only on the 11 states that President Obama won in the
preceding general election; the Democratic Party’s candidate only won four elections. 7
Based upon the estimated 0.4 percent increase in vote share that the president can bring
with a visit, there are at least two elections in which the president could have potentially
flipped the election. These states are Florida and Massachusetts in which there were no
visits by the president, rather candidates in those states distanced themselves from the
president. If there had been just a few visits, the president to either candidate could have
changed the outcome of the election and there could have been a Democrat elected
instead of a Republican. This finding would provide evidence for my first hypothesis.

7

These states are Colorado, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
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This picture changes when the model includes an interaction term between total
visits and partisanship, the picture changes as demonstrated in Figure 2. At lower levels
of partisanship of the president’s party: total visits effect on the vote share of the
candidate from their party is about two percent of additional vote share per visit.
However, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase to about .55:
total visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is indistinguishable
from zero. Furthermore, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase
past .75: total visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is, in fact,
negative. This finding is both interesting and important that when accounting for the
relationship between visits and partisanship, the impact is contingent upon the partisan
makeup of a state.
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Rally visits, like total visits, when not accounting for the interaction between
visits and partisanship are consistently significant and positive. The positive coefficient
tells us that there is a direct relationship between rally visits and vote share, which was
the expected relationship based on my hypothesis and theory. This demonstrates that
candidates of the president’s party that receive rally visits from the president receive a
higher percentage of vote share than they would have if they had not received a visit from
the president. The coefficient of rally visits in my cross-sectional column signifies that
when there is a rally visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected
percentage of the vote share received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to
increase by 1.4%. In my panel model, the coefficient signifies that when there is a visit
by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share
received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 1.6%. While in the
panel model with the fundraiser visits and partisanship interaction, the coefficient
signifies that when there is a visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the
expected percentage of the vote share received by that gubernatorial candidate is
predicted to increase by 1.8%. Although in the panel model with the other visits and
partisanship interaction, the slope coefficient is 0.016, which signifies that when there is a
visit by a president to a gubernatorial candidate, the expected percentage of the vote share
received by that gubernatorial candidate is predicted to increase by 1.6%. This difference
in vote share from a presidential visit has the ability to affect the outcome of close
elections.
Thus, the type of visit matters when distinguishing between types of visits. I find
that in terms of increasing vote share when distinguishing between types of visits that
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rally visits are the best. Although other visits do matter, when the interaction term is
introduced, it shows that rally visits are consistently significant and consistently help
candidates of the president’s party. This finding of rally visits improving a candidate’s
vote share by around one and a half percentage points on average is another important
discovery. When observing those same close gubernatorial elections from the 2014
midterm elections and focusing only on the states that President Obama won in the
preceding general election, there were eleven states to focus on. 8 Based upon the
estimated one and a half percentage point increase in the vote share that the president can
bring with a rally visit, only one seat is flipped, and that state is Florida. While multiple
rally visits could have potentially changed the outcome for multiple states.
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These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
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However, once again the picture differs when the interaction term between rally
visits and partisanship interaction is introduced in column 3 as seen in Figure 3. At lower
levels of partisanship of the president’s party: rally visits effect on the vote share of the
candidate from their party is about seven percent of additional vote share per visit.
Although, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase to about .45:
rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is indistinguishable
from zero. Furthermore, when the levels of partisanship of the president’s party increase
past .73: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is, in fact,
negative. This, like total visit, is both interesting and important when accounting for the
relationship between visits and partisanship impact is contingent upon the partisan
makeup of a state.
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When distinguishing between the types of visits, some of the findings I expected
while others I did not. For example, fundraiser visits were consistently not significant.
However, this demonstrates that different types of visits have different impacts like those
that I expected. However, as seen in Figure 4, there is some significance for fundraisers
when the interaction term is introduced to the model specification between fundraiser
visits and partisanship. At lower levels of partisanship of the president’s party:
fundraisers visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is about 4.5
percent of additional vote share per visit. Although, when the levels of partisanship of the
president’s party increase to .35: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from
their party is indistinguishable from zero and remains so. This is interesting and
important as there appears to be a lack of significance overall for fundraiser visits.
However, when accounting for the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact
is contingent upon the partisan makeup of a state where there is slight significance when
the partisan makeup is below .35.
However different from the previous three interaction visit specifications, other
visits were not statistically significance in any of the model specifications; this once
again demonstrates that different types of visits have different impacts. These results are
consistent with the five model specifications. This lack of significance in all of the
models including the model where the interaction term shows a finding of consistency.
This finding could be demonstrating that there is a lack of consistency in the
categorization of what is another visit. This is seen at all levels of partisanship of the
president’s party: rally visits effect on the vote share of the candidate from their party is
indistinguishable from zero. This finding of non-significance is large as the results
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indicate that in terms of final vote share, other visits have no impact. This means that
there is no difference on vote share whether this visit by the president occurs.
When looking at other determinates of vote share in the total visits model
specifications found in Table 2 there are two factors I find are consistently significant in
all of the models in which they are included. First, whether the president won Electoral
College votes in the previous election. Second, I find that the national approval of the
president in September of the midterm election year is consistently significant. The
approval being significant is an interesting finding because Eshbaugh-Soha et al. and
Lang et al. find that approval is not a significant factor while observing the strategic
motivations of a president. They surmise that perhaps this is because national popularity
may not drive local visiting trends. While national popularity may not drive local visiting
trends, it does, in fact, affect the vote share as originally demonstrated by Simon. This
seems to demonstrate the common finding that midterm gubernatorial elections have
some sort of referenda effect on the party of the president.
Other predictors of vote share that are somewhat consistently significant in the
models, meaning they are significant in two of the three models, including first
partisanship. Another variable that is significant is unemployment rate, which has
significance in two of the three models. Perhaps it is not significant in the panel model
because there is not enough variation in these types of variables such as national
unemployment rate when controlling for the state. Then the number of years the
president’s party held the White House is significant in two-thirds of the models. Perhaps
this is a similar explanation as the variables that are constant over an election cycle do not
allow for enough variation once controlling for the state. Only one predictor is found to
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be slightly significant, meaning that it is only significant in one of the three models. That
predictor is median income, which is only found to be significant in the models that
control for the state, perhaps demonstrating that the variation between states is only seen
once the state is controlled for. Overall, these findings are consistent with previous
research as well as the expected relationships discussed in my data section.
Other determinates of vote share that are found to be significant in Table 3 when
distinguishing between types include two multiple factors. The first factor I find is
significant is the national approval of the president in September of the midterm election
year. Other predictors of vote share that are found to be somewhat consistently significant
meaning that they are significant in at least three of the five models include another two
factors. The first of these determinates is partisanship. The second of these determinates
is if the president won Electoral College votes in the previous election. However, three
determinants are found to be only slightly significant meaning they are only significant in
between one and three of the model specifications. The first of those factors with slight
significance is unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is significant in two of the
five specifications. What is even more interesting is that one of the two results actually
has a coefficient that was positive as opposed to the expected negative coefficient. A
reason for this might be the same as discussed above for the total visit models in which
the data used as is a national level indicator, thus it may not have enough variation once
controlling for the location to show significance. The second of the three determinates
with slight significance is median income which is only significant in one of the five
specifications. Then finally, the numbers of years the president’s party has held the White
House only has slight significance in two of the five model specifications perhaps for
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similar reasons to the unemployment rate. For the most part, these are consistent with the
findings from other studies and in accordance with the expected relationship as discussed
above.
My research suggests that this vote share boost from a presidential visit is real and
can affect the outcome of close elections. However, it is also clear that the effectiveness
and the nature of an impact is based on the partisan composition of a state. Also based on
my findings it appears that a candidate may not win, but without presidential visits,
candidates could have ended up with a lower amount of vote share, in fact losing worse
than the final result. This finding is significant as it shows external validity for the work
of Cohen et al. However, there is a large caveat in this finding that vote share is boosted
by presidential visits. The stipulation of my findings is that the impact of a visit is
dependent on the strategic calculation component discussed in previous research. While
the states I discuss in regards to the 2014 election are only competitive states that the
president had previously won. This is because they are closest to being flipped in terms of
vote share. However, as seen in my discussion above the largest potential impact a
president such as President Obama could have is in a state such as Kansas or Wyoming as
the impact would not be the same. This is contrary to conventional wisdom that surmises
that those types of visits would have a negative impact. However, as demonstrated above
that is incorrect. Moreover, this is not to say that Kansas or Wyoming would be flipped
from red to blue it would just make the margin of victory for the winning party smaller.
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CONCLUSION
Presidential visits can have a significant and positive relationship on midterm
gubernatorial elections. The change in vote share seems to occur because presidential
visits help gubernatorial candidates reestablish enthusiasm among their key
constituencies. This means presidential visits increase the vote share of midterm
gubernatorial candidates of his party. This finding demonstrates that the work of Cohen et
al. has external validity, as their finding related to Senate elections is applicable to
gubernatorial elections. My findings support my second hypothesis that different types of
presidential visits in fact have different impacts on candidates. However, when looking at
the interaction between visits and partisanship, the impact of visits is seen to be
dependent upon on the partisan composition of a state. I further demonstrate that rally
visits have a consistently significant and typically positive impact on midterm
gubernatorial elections, although the interacting term shows some variation in the impact.
My work also shows that fundraiser visits have a less significant and a much more
limited effect on midterm gubernatorial elections. My work further demonstrates that
different types of visits do in fact have varying impacts on candidates as it shows that
other visits have no significance and no effect on midterm gubernatorial elections.
This thesis has multiple contributions to presidential scholarship. The impact of
visits by the president on midterm gubernatorial elections is consistently positive for the
candidates of the president’s party meaning that visits improve the vote share obtained by
those candidates while not using any interactions. However, I demonstrate the importance
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of considering the partisan nature of a state when determining the expected impact of a
visit to the state. This is not only a significant contribution to scholarship but it is also a
significant contribution to campaign management. This is because it demonstrates that
campaigns under the circumstances outlined by the study of the strategic calculation
should want the sitting president to come campaign for their candidate. In addition,
presidents should be able to campaign knowing that their efforts have a positive impact
on the vote share of those candidates they strategically select.
Based on the findings and contributions of my thesis, there are a few different
implications that could be discussed. Out of all of these implications, perhaps the most
interesting is based on a finding of slight significance and non-significance. This is seen
as out of all the visit types, the one type that seems to have very slim significance as it is
only partially significant in one of the five models is fundraiser visits. However, perhaps
there is an actual explanation for why fundraiser visits only have this level of
significance. Remembering that the dependent variable in the analysis is the vote share of
the candidate from the president’s party, fundraisers do not have a direct impact and
while this is not the purpose of this paper, perhaps there is a simple theory to demonstrate
why this might, in fact, be the case. This potential theory is perhaps best illustrated by an
example involving President Obama and former Illinois Governor Quinn. In leading up to
the 2014 midterm elections, President Obama held a fundraiser on the behalf of Governor
Quinn. There was in total 25 attendees each paying $50,000 to attend the event. Perhaps
it is not such a surprise that there is not a direct effect on vote share as a fundraiser has
thousands of people less in attendance than a rally, and perhaps the direct purpose of a
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fundraiser visit is not to effect vote share. This different purpose of fundraiser visits and
their impact on elections could be looked at in further research.
Other implications of my thesis seem to further illustrate other aspects of
scholarship. For example, Cohen et al. found that visits have a positive impact for Senate
candidates, and I was able to find that visits have without the interaction also have a
positive impact on gubernatorial candidates. The implication of this finding is that
perhaps elections are very closely related. This could be particularly true as the same
constituencies elect both Senators and Governors, and often at the same time. This is an
idea that has been examined in previous literature related to the different determinates of
gubernatorial elections. Another implication as previously discussed is that different
types of visits have different types of impacts, for example, fundraisers have a slight
statistical impact. Based upon this, perhaps presidents need to focus more on rally visits
in the future for candidates than any other types of visits.
A different, yet important set of implications based on the findings and
contributions of this research is that it has demonstrated future directions of research. One
example of what future research could look at is the different ways of separating out
types of visits. This could be done by looking at a division between candidate-centered
visits and committee-centered visits to see if there is any different effect on vote share for
an individual candidate when there is more than one candidate in attendance. Another
direction of future research could potentially be to look at one of the other different
definitions of visits to see if the results remain constant.
Finally, among many other things, future research could potentially look at other
types of measures of impacts as I only looked at the final vote share of the candidate from
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the president’s party. One way impact could be measured is taking into account both
actual vote in the election and the average performance in that election over several
previous elections. This allows for an estimate of how well the party did in the states the
president visited relative to how it should do. In so doing, the difference between the
actual vote and the expected vote would be the impact of the visit by the president while
controlling for other factors. Other types of measures of impacts could include a binary
variable for a win or a loss for the candidate of the president’s party. Another variable
that could be looked at is fundraising numbers for candidates. Another direction of future
research could be looking at poll numbers and using them to try to measure the impact of
a visit. Another thing that future research should look at is if the casual mechanism to
whether the president does, in fact, increase turnout for candidates that they visit. This
line of inquiry is even more necessary in determining the causal mechanism as I find that
partisanship affects the type of impact that a visit has even leading a president to
potentially having a negative impact on the gubernatorial candidate from their party.
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